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Reconstruction and Resistance
CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST WORLD.
By Jack M. Balkin. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University
Press, 2011. 304 pages. $35.00.
LIVING ORIGINALISM. By Jack M. Balkin. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011. 480 pages. $35.00.

Reviewed by Kermit Roosevelt III*
Introduction
Jack Balkin defies categorization. More precisely, he defies categories.
His most recent books, Living Originalism1 and Constitutional Redemption,2
transcend the dichotomies of constitutional theory. Repeatedly, they show
that what conventional wisdom views as a strict opposition (originalism
versus the living constitution, for instance) is in fact not an opposition at all,
or that a traditional taxonomic dyad (constitutional law and ordinary politics,
for instance) is incomplete. His arguments are forceful, elegant, and, I
believe, generally correct. Frequently, in fact, they bear the hallmark of truly
deep insights: they seem obvious in retrospect. It is possible that these two
books will mark a real advance in constitutional theory.
But it is also possible that they will not. There are reasons that people
cling to the theories and conceptual structures that Balkin undermines, and
those reasons are not purely intellectual. There is a political element to
constitutional law, of course; there is also a political element to constitutional
theory. The presence of political considerations complicates the reception of
any constitutional theory.
Politics also complicates the theory itself. To Balkin’s credit, he
acknowledges this. The books spend a substantial amount of time discussing
how moral and political visions inform constitutional theory and become
constitutional law. But they also argue for particular constitutional results,
and this creates some tension within the enterprise. It is difficult for a single
project, even one contained in two books, to employ both an internal and an
external perspective—to explain how constitutional entrepreneurs succeed in
making their views law and also to engage in the entrepreneurial venture. As

* Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. Thanks to Alisa Melekhina for
excellent research assistance.
1. JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011) [hereinafter BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM].
2. JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST WORLD
(2011) [hereinafter BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION].
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when a magician reveals how the trick is done and then performs it, some of
the conviction is lost.
The tension between the internal and external perspectives, I believe, is
not fully resolved within these books. Balkin’s external perspective,
historicism, seems to offer scant normative footing for his internal
arguments, and his account of constitutional change, partisan entrenchment,
does not make up for this lack. He turns, then, to the idea of redemption, but
I will suggest that this is theoretically not fully satisfactory. Nor, however, is
it necessary. Properly understood—understood as Balkin understands it—the
Constitution itself supplies the magic that seemed to be missing. In what
follows, I will try to demonstrate this. Part I of this review describes the state
of constitutional theory into which Living Originalism and Constitutional
Redemption come. Part II discusses the possibilities they offer, considering
in particular Balkin’s distinction between the meaning of a constitutional
provision, which is fixed, and the applications of that meaning, which may
change over time. I will offer a slightly different way of thinking about
which constitutional provisions are intended to have fixed applications (I will
distinguish between forward-looking and backward-looking provisions,
rather than rules and principles), but I believe that the distinction is both
correct and crucially important to constitutional theory. Part III draws out
some implications of the distinction for the process of constitutional change.
I believe that my account here is broadly consistent with Balkin’s views,
although it also differs in some ways. I talk about constitutional politics,
rather than constitutional construction, and I suggest that my version offers
greater normative purchase. Part IV takes a more critical turn. It examines
the idea of redemption—the stance Balkin suggests we should take towards
the Constitution. While I have some reservations about the idea in general,
my chief concern is that Balkin has chosen the wrong text to redeem.
I.

The Players and the Stakes

For approximately the past thirty years, conventional wisdom has
divided constitutional theory into two camps.3 On one side stand the
originalists, who defend the original understanding of the Constitution and
insist that constitutional change can come about only through the amendment
process specified in Article V.4 On the other are the living constitutionalists,
who believe that the Constitution must be flexible enough to adapt to
changing times and circumstances even without formal amendment, typically
through judicial interpretation.5

3. DENNIS J. GOLDFORD, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION AND THE DEBATE OVER
ORIGINALISM 24, 55 (2005).
4. Id. at 55, 138.
5. Id. at 55.
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Conventional wisdom also holds that originalists were political
conservatives and living constitutionalists liberals.6 It is possible to dress up
the debate in more theoretical terms. Originalists distrust judges and want to
bind them, one might say, while living constitutionalists trust them and want
to empower them.7 Originalists believe judicial decisions about values are
legitimate if they can be traced back to the framers and ratifiers;8 living
constitutionalists believe legitimacy comes from current popular opinion.9
Originalists want to say that constitutional outcomes are not our
responsibility, while living constitutionalists insist that they are.10
But as a matter of actual historical fact, the political description,
reductionist though it may be, is largely correct. Originalism did not come to
prominence solely because of theoretical considerations. Arguments that
sound in some variant of originalism have, of course, been around since the
Founding. Madison, arguing against the First Bank of the United States,
appealed to the expectations of the ratifiers;11 more notoriously, Chief Justice
Roger Taney defended his decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford12 in strongly
originalist terms.13 In recent history, however, originalism received a
substantial boost from the Reagan Justice Department, and in particular from
Attorney General Edwin Meese.14 Reagan and Meese were not abstract
constitutional scholars; they were interested in political results like reining in
judges and correcting the perceived excesses of the Warren Court.15
Originalism achieved this result, or at least contributed to it. In part it
may have done so by changing minds. It is possible that there were some
people, maybe even some judges, who thought about the Constitution
differently because they had been exposed to originalist arguments. But
primarily it achieved its goals by changing personnel.

6. Id.
7. See id. at 20–24 (discussing the political climate in which originalism became prominent).
8. Id. at 33–35.
9. Id. at 59–61.
10. Though diametrically opposed, these aspirations are both fatal to the success of the
respective theories, according to Balkin. A successful constitutional theory, he claims, must allow
us to see the Constitution as basic law (which creates a stable structure of government), as higher
law (which embodies values and principles), and as our law (which embodies our values and
principles). BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 1, at 59–60. Originalism, with its insistence
on tracing value choices back to the ratifiers, fails to make the Constitution our law or higher law,
while living constitutionalism imperils its status as basic law. Id. at 61–63, 279.
11. ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT 73 (1992).
12. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV.
13. Austin Allen, An Exaggerated Legacy: Dred Scott and Substantive Due Process, in THE
DRED SCOTT CASE: HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON RACE AND LAW 83, 91–
92 (David Thomas Konig et al. eds., 2010).
14. Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J. 657, 680 (2009).
15. See id. at 680–81 (explaining that Reagan and Meese wanted to promote democratic selfgovernment).
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Liberal academic theory responded to originalism largely by coming up
with explanations of why judges were justified in doing what they were
doing. Judges were good at handling matters of principle, suggested Alex
Bickel;16 they could aspire to be philosophers, proposed Ronald Dworkin;17
they could assert themselves when the democratic process was likely to fail,
said John Hart Ely.18
Whatever one thinks of these responses, they are directed to judges.
And while liberals were talking to the judges, telling them to keep on doing
what they were doing, conservatives were talking to the people. They were
warning them of judicial activism, telling them that they were ruled by
unaccountable elites, and urging them to keep faith with the Founding
Fathers.19 Originalism helped conservative candidates run against the courts
in the name of the Constitution. When these conservatives won, they
appointed conservative judges. Naturally, the courts changed course, and
when in 1997 Ronald Dworkin and a dream team of philosophers set out to
explain to the Court why the Constitution protected physician-assisted
suicide,20 it should have surprised no one that the opinion did not dignify
their amicus brief with so much as a mention.21
In the academy, originalism did not fare so well. Various deficiencies
were pointed out.22 But liberal academic thinking did not coalesce around a
plausible or easily summarized alternative. As Justice Scalia argued, “it
takes a theory to beat a theory,”23 and the result appeared to be largely
stalemate, sniping, and trench warfare.24

16. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF POLITICS 23–28 (1962).
17. RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 7–12 (1996) [hereinafter DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW]; see also RONALD
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 149 (1978) (calling for “a fusion of constitutional law and
moral theory” and claiming that philosophy is as much a part of law as sociology and economics).
18. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 101–04
(1980).
19. For a canonical early statement of this view, see RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY
JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 417 (1977). For a debased
descendant, see MARK R. LEVIN, MEN IN BLACK: HOW THE SUPREME COURT IS DESTROYING
AMERICA 11–12 (2005).
20. Brief for Ronald Dworkin et al. as Amici Curiae in support of Respondents at 3,
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (Nos. 95-1858, 96-110), 1996 WL 708956.
21. See generally Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702.
22. For a brief summary describing the weaknesses of “Old Originalism,” see Thomas B.
Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 713, 716–37 (2011).
23. See James E. Ryan, Laying Claim to the Constitution: The Promise of New Textualism, 97
VA. L. REV. 1523, 1536 (2011) (citing Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CINN. L.
REV. 849, 855 (1989)) (characterizing Justice Scalia’s position as “essentially . . . it takes a theory
to beat a theory”).
24. As recently as 2009, Jamal Greene commented that “[n]onoriginalists have been on the
defensive of late.” Jamal Greene, On the Origins of Originalism, 88 TEXAS L. REV. 1, 86 (2009).
Originalism faces difficulties too, however. See generally Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is
Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2009) (underlining the fact that originalists disagree amongst
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Text and Principle

The main theoretical move that Balkin makes is to reject the supposed
dichotomy between originalism and the living constitution. He calls them
“two sides of the same coin,”25 which is perhaps overly charitable. As
described, the coin is of no value. What Balkin actually shows is that they
are, as conventionally understood, both obviously defective theories that no
sensible person would hold. Classic living constitutionalism is silly for all
the reasons conservatives point out. The idea that judges must sometimes,
somehow, “update” the Constitution to keep it in step with the times is
neither helpful to a judge trying in good faith to discharge her role, nor
encouraging to a citizen wanting to see himself as a participant in the
ongoing project of constitutional self-governance.
Classic originalism is no better, however. It makes a profound error in
supposing that fidelity to the original meaning of the Constitution requires
that cases be decided, to the extent possible, as if they had been brought
immediately after the ratification of the relevant constitutional provision.26 If
the courts of 1868 would not have held a particular state practice
unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment, that is, classic
originalism holds that a modern court should not do so either. Constitutional
provisions, on this view, are designed to fix certain outcomes for all time, or
at least until amended.
This view is obviously mistaken because while some constitutional
provisions might be intended to fix outcomes in that way, others might not.
Classic originalism fails to distinguish between different types of provisions.
Balkin’s taxonomy includes rules, standards, principles, and silences.27
Determinate rules, such as those setting age-based qualifications for office,
dictate particular results regardless of time and circumstance.28 Standards,
such as the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on “unreasonable” searches,
may direct different results as times and circumstances change.29 General
principles, like the requirement of equal protection, require elaboration (what
Balkin calls “construction”30) by future generations.

themselves over several aspects of their creed and criticizing originalism (hard and soft) as being
based on faulty logic and ultimately impractical).
25. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 1, at 20.
26. See GOLDFORD, supra note 3, at 9 (“[O]riginalism at its simplest holds that a constitutional
provision means precisely what it meant to the generation that wrote and ratified it, and not, as
nonoriginalism would contend, what it might mean differently to any subsequent generation.”).
27. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION, supra note 2, at 229.
28. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 1, at 6.
29. See id. at 6–7 (“Adopters use fixed rules because they want to limit discretion; they use
standards or principles because they want to channel politics through certain key concepts but
delegate the details to future generations.”).
30. See id. at 44 (“[V]ague and abstract clauses [such as ‘equal protection of the laws’] will
likely reflect contemporary understandings rather than original understandings.”).
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One might also describe this taxonomy in a slightly different way,
focusing on the purpose of the constitutional provision. Some provisions,
like the age requirements31 and the division of Congress into House and
Senate,32 are structural. They create the institutions of government and the
means by which ordinary politics will be conducted. Absent a strong
indication to the contrary, it is reasonable to expect that these provisions are
intended to be dead, as Justice Scalia puts it when being puckish, or
enduring, as he puts it when not.33 Other provisions are what Richard Primus
calls “concrete negation[s],”34 designed to take off the table certain policies
and practices which have been judged categorically undesirable. These
provisions—such as the Third Amendment’s ban on peacetime quartering of
troops in houses35 or the Thirteenth Amendment’s ban on slavery36—are
backward looking. They focus on a well-defined practice and say “never
again.”37 Many of these are rights provisions, but not all—one could also
point to the creation of life tenure for federal judges and the prohibition of
salary reductions as concrete negations of practices complained of in the
Declaration of Independence, namely King George’s making “Judges
dependent on his Will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the amount
and payment of their salaries.”38 Backward-looking provisions, like
structural ones, should ordinarily be understood to have a fixed and
determinate set of applications.
Forward-looking provisions are different. A forward-looking provision
has a fixed meaning: it might require states to avoid invidious discrimination,
as our Equal Protection Clause essentially does,39 or it might (to use an
imaginary example) require Senators to wear the latest fashions while
engaged in debate.40 But it does not contemplate a static range of
31. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (“No Person shall be a Representative who shall not
have attained to the Age of twenty five Years . . . .”).
32. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
33. Antonin Scalia, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S., Wriston Lecture at the
Manhattan Institute for Policy Research: On Interpreting the Constitution (Nov. 17, 1997), available
at http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/wl1997.htm (“Come along with me and admire the
Dead Constitution. I have to get a new term for it . . . [M]aybe the Enduring Constitution. That’s a
little better.”).
34. RICHARD A. PRIMUS, THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE OF RIGHTS 7 (1999).
35. U.S. CONST. amend. III.
36. Id. amend. XIII, § 1.
37. They could just say “never,” but typically such provisions arise from experience with the
prohibited practice. The suggested federal marriage amendment, S.J. Res. 1, 109th Cong. (2005),
which would have preemptively banned same-sex marriage, is a notable counterexample. But
perhaps precisely because there was no experience to demonstrate the evils of same-sex marriage,
the amendment failed to gain traction. See Carl Hulse, Senate Rebuffs Same-Sex Marriage Ban,
N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/08/washington/08cong.html
(explaining the Senate vote striking down the bill).
38. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
39. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
40. KERMIT ROOSEVELT III, THE MYTH OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: MAKING SENSE OF SUPREME
COURT DECISIONS 51 (2006).
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applications. Conduct that might have complied with its requirement at one
point (racially segregating public schools in 1868, say, or wearing a
powdered wig in 1789) will violate that requirement later.
It is reasonable to debate whether particular constitutional provisions
are forward looking or backward looking. It is not reasonable to deny the
possibility of a forward-looking provision, which classic originalism seems
to do, at least implicitly. To make an explicit argument, one might claim that
constitution drafters are very unlikely to write forward-looking provisions.
Justice Scalia has suggested as much, arguing that the whole point of a
constitution is to prevent backsliding—to ensure a set of minimum standards
that the future must respect.41
But that is not the whole point of a constitution, as Balkin notes.42 That
is the point of a backward-looking provision. The point of a forward-looking
provision is not to remove or require certain identified practices; it is to
delegate the application of a principle to future generations.43 Drafters might
do this for several reasons. They might hope that future generations will be
similar to them, while knowing that future circumstances will change, so that
a delegation is the best way of achieving the outcomes they would have
desired had they been able to predict the future. (I would guess that the
Fourth Amendment reasonableness requirement44 was supposed to work this
way.) Drafters might anticipate that future generations will be different and
intend to let the future’s views prevail within the framework they have set
out. (This would be the purpose of my fictitious “latest fashions” clause; it
might also be the purpose of the Equal Protection Clause.) Or they might be
aiming to promote national unity and uniformity, rather than particular
substantive values. At the Founding, they might want to constrain the
practices of the federal government by reference to those of the states,
prohibiting the federal government from imposing punishments that most
states rejected as too cruel. (This is the evolving view of the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause.45) After the Civil War, they might have wanted
to use national opinion as to the fairness of certain kinds of discrimination to

41. Antonin Scalia, Response, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW 129, 145 (1997); see also, John O. McGinnis & Michael Rappaport, Original Interpretive
Principles as the Core of Originalism, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 371, 372 (2007) (offering the theory
that constitution drafters are risk averse and would therefore avoid delegations). The logic behind
this is not clear to me.
42. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 1, at 28–29.
43. As Balkin puts it, the Constitution is intended also to “channel and discipline future
political judgment.” Id. at 29.
44. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
45. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (“The [Eighth] Amendment must draw its
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society”); see
also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 561 (2005) (affirming the necessity of referring to society’s
“evolving standards of decency” when determining which punishments are so disproportionate as to
be cruel and unusual).
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rein in outlier states. (This seems a reasonable purpose for the Equal
Protection Clause and is historically the role it has played.46)
In short, the idea of a forward-looking provision cannot be dismissed
out of hand. It is plausible that this is how some of our constitutional
provisions are designed to function; it is undeniable that it is how some have
functioned. In fact, there is a reasonable argument that enforcing the will of
a national majority against outlier states is what the Supreme Court does best.
Its race equality cases such as Brown v. Board of Education47 and Loving v.
Virginia48 fit this pattern and have been relatively unqualified successes.
They are accepted by the legal community and the public to such an extent
that constitutional theories are deemed failures and Supreme Court nominees
rejected if they suggest those cases are wrongly decided. When the Court
takes on states without the support of a national majority and the federal
government, it produces decisions more like Lochner v. New York49 and Roe
v. Wade.50 These decisions, particularly Roe, have their supporters, but for
substantial segments of the legal community they serve as the opposite kind
of litmus test: nominees and theories must reject them. Last, when the Court
takes on the other branches of the federal government, its results are mixed at
best. A case like Boumediene v. Bush51 is a good example: the Court
announced grand principles, but in the face of opposition from the political
branches (and a notable lack of enthusiasm from the D.C. Circuit) the
practical significance has been very slight.52
Thus, the distinction between original meaning and original expected
application makes obvious theoretical sense and is also a good fit with our
actual constitutional practice. It allows for a reconciliation of sorts between

46. See Kermit Roosevelt III, Interpretation and Construction: Originalism and Its Discontents,
34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 99, 102–03 (2011) (arguing that courts have used the Equal Protection
Clause to end discrimination that was supported by only a minority of states).
47. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
48. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
49. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
50. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). On pushback from the states and negative popular reaction to these
two cases, see BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE 175–77, 298–99 (2009).
51. 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
52. See generally Stephen I. Vladeck, The D.C. Circuit After Boumediene, 41 SETON HALL L.
REV. 1451 (2011) (outlining the D.C. Circuit’s efforts to limit the effect of Boumediene). One
might also look for examples to the World War II cases about the rights of Japanese Americans.
E.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Ex parte Mitsuye Endo, 323 U.S. 283
(1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). In these cases, the Court offered no real
resistance to federal mistreatment of a vulnerable group, though it did at least try to articulate the
principle that detention required individualized proof of disloyalty. See Patrick O. Gudridge,
Remember Endo?, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1933, 1951–52 (2003) (indicating the Court’s discomfort
with detention when it has no relationship to the loyalty of Japanese Americans or the war effort).
Less charitably, one might point to the cases in which the Supreme Court sought to hold back the
New Deal, cases like United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) and A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp.
v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). There the Court gave ground and backed down in later
decisions such as United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) and NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
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originalism and the living constitution; there is one dichotomy transcended.
It also, we shall see, allows for a different understanding of the relation of
social and political movements to the Constitution.
III. Constitutional Politics, Constitutional Change
The conventional view of the relation between the Constitution and
ordinary politics is that the two together exhaust the field. Some issues the
Constitution decides; the rest are left up to the political process.53 But like
the dichotomy between originalism and the living constitution, this is a false
choice: there is a third way.
The third possibility is what we could call constitutional politics. (It is
roughly what I think Balkin has in mind by “constitutional construction,”54
though I do not claim that my exposition here tracks his precisely.)
Constitutional politics determines how courts apply forward-looking
provisions.
Suppose for the moment that the Equal Protection Clause is such a
provision. It prohibits, let us say, unjustified or oppressive discrimination, of
the sort the Court has sometimes called “invidious.”55 An individual comes
to court complaining that a state has engaged in such discrimination by, for
instance, prohibiting interracial marriages or excluding women from the
practice of law. How should the court decide whether this claim is sound?
Classic originalism would tell us to look at what the drafters and
ratifiers of the Equal Protection Clause would have said, and the historical
evidence is relatively clear that they would have viewed these state law
classifications as acceptable.56
Living constitutionalism, in its
undertheorized form, would have judges somehow decide on their own,
based perhaps on their best philosophical understanding of the idea of
equality.57 But neither of these approaches, according to the account I have
developed, is the correct way to apply a forward-looking provision. Instead,
courts should look to national sentiment, ideally as reflected in objective

53. See Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103 NW. U. L.
REV. 549, 557 (2009) (describing the view that “absent the use of the amendment process . . .
political decisions do not add anything significant to the constitutional plan [but] occur as
permissible activity within the plan”).
54. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 1, at 5 (explaining Balkin’s definition of the
term “constitutional construction”).
55. E.g., Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71 (1968); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8 (1967);
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955).
56. See BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 1, at 8 (arguing that applying the original
expected application of the Constitution would be “inconsistent with constitutional guarantees of
sex equality for married women, with constitutional protection of interracial marriage, with the
constitutional right to use contraceptives, and with the modern scope of free-speech rights under the
First Amendment” (footnotes omitted)).
57. Id. at 278.
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indicia such as state laws and state court decisions, to guide their application
of the federal constitutional principle.58
If the Equal Protection Clause is a forward-looking provision, then,
there is a correct answer to the question whether some form of discrimination
is unconstitutional. But the answer depends on what the nation thinks is
invidious discrimination and what it thinks is reasonable. The correct
outcome is not determined by the Framers, as classic originalism would have
it, nor by judges, as living constitutionalism suggests. Instead, it is
determined by social movements and political mobilizations. Forces such as
the civil rights and feminist movements change society’s views about the
appropriate treatment of blacks and women, and in so doing they change the
requirements of the Constitution—though not its meaning.
Forward-looking provisions thus give us one explanation for how
constitutional outcomes can change, how a practice that was accepted at the
ratification of the Equal Protection Clause can be unconstitutional some
years later without an intervening amendment.
The operation of
constitutional politics makes arguments that seem “merely” political or
moral—arguments about fairness and hierarchy—of constitutional stature.
Another explanation, which is related, is that it may be that what has
changed is not the constitutional requirement but the judicially created
doctrine that implements it. Courts may start out thinking that they should be
very deferential to legislatures with respect to the question of whether some
state act is consistent with a constitutional principle, but later become more
suspicious or the reverse. This shift in the level of deference gives a fairly
straightforward explanation of whether, and how, Plessy and Lochner were
wrong when decided, the subject of one chapter of Constitutional
Redemption.59
The answer is that both Plessy and Lochner were correct in their
exposition of constitutional principles, at least in the sense that we still
adhere to similar views. Plessy explained that the Equal Protection Clause
prohibited classifications designed “for the annoyance or oppression of a
particular class,”60 and the Lochner Court understood the Due Process Clause
to require that state laws promote the public interest.61 We still hold those
principles. What has changed since Plessy and Lochner is not the Court’s

58. Again, this is a description that fits the practice of the Supreme Court. Loving, for instance,
followed a pattern of judicial and legislative actions striking down antimiscegenation laws at the
state level: In the fifteen years preceding Loving, fourteen states had repealed their
antimiscegenation laws through legislative action. Loving, 388 U.S. at 6 n.5. And in 1948,
California’s Supreme Court held that the state’s antimiscegenation statute was unconstitutional in
the case Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948).
59. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION, supra note 2, at ch. 7.
60. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550 (1896).
61. See Kermit Roosevelt III, Forget the Fundamentals: Fixing Substantive Due Process, 8 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 983, 986–87 (2006) (stating that one theme of substantive due process
jurisprudence was that government action must serve a public purpose).
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reading of the Constitution’s principles, but rather its view about how
deferential it should be to state legislatures in deciding whether laws are
consistent with them. The Plessy Court was very deferential, but a modern
Court would be highly suspicious of a racial classification. The Lochner
Court was not deferential for it believed it had bright-line rules that would let
judges draw the required boundaries.62 A modern court would declare itself
incapable of second-guessing legislative assessments: “[W]hen the
legislature has spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms wellnigh conclusive.”63
Once we distinguish between underlying principles and implementing
doctrine, the question of correctness looks a bit different. As far as the level
of deference is concerned, there is no clear standard by which to call a
decision right or wrong. We can, however, ask whether there is a good
explanation for the choice of a particular level. On that question, Plessy’s
choice to defer seems extremely dubious. The Louisiana legislature in the
1890s should not have been given a great deal of latitude to weigh the
interests of its black citizens against those of its whites; it was predictable
that it would make bad decisions.64 Lochner’s refusal to defer is a bit more
defensible; in the intellectual environment in which the Court operated, it
believed it had tools that allowed it to patrol the boundaries of the public
interest.65 When those tools broke, under the influence of Legal Realism and
the Great Depression, the Court appropriately backed down.66
Balkin does not explicitly discuss the role of shifting doctrine, but it is
related to what I have called constitutional politics in that changed views
about what is reasonable often drive changes in the level of deference. If
certain kinds of discrimination are generally viewed as reasonable, courts
tend to evaluate challenges to them deferentially; if they are generally viewed

62. See id. at 991 (explaining that Lochner-era judicial review came to be seen as illegitimate
when the categorical lines the Court sought to create broke down).
63. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
64. See THOMAS J. DAVIS, PLESSY V. FERGUSON: LANDMARKS OF THE AMERICAN MOSAIC
135 (2012) (stating that white Democrats had captured most of Louisiana’s state legislature by the
late 1870s, allowing them to adopt a new state constitution that shifted away from equal rights,
eliminated bans on racially segregated schools, and added an annual poll tax that was onerous on
blacks and Creoles).
65. See Jack M. Balkin, “Wrong the Day It Was Decided”: Lochner and Constitutional
Historicism, 85 B.U. L. REV. 677, 687–88 (2005) (claiming that the jurisprudence of the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries “represented a fairly sophisticated police power theory of
limited government” and reflected the idea that “the [Fourteenth] Amendment was designed to
prevent so-called ‘class legislation’ that favored one group over another”); David E. Bernstein,
Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised: Lochner and the Origins of Fundamental Rights
Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L.J. 1, 45–46 (2003) (suggesting that the Court saw the Fourteenth
Amendment as preserving the common law and natural rights tradition which limited freedom for
the social good).
66. Bernstein, supra note 65, at 50–51 (claiming that the Court’s commitment to established
constitutional limitations on government, along with its libertarian views and Lochnerian
jurisprudence, were weakened through legal realism and the Great Depression).
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as invidious, courts are more likely to use heightened scrutiny. And changes
in doctrine and constitutional politics alike fit within what Balkin describes
as historicism, the view that “the conventions determining what is a good or
bad legal argument about the Constitution, what is a plausible legal claim,
and what is ‘off-the-wall’ change over time in response to changing social,
political, and historical conditions.”67
Historicism as Balkin describes it is consistent with the idea that the
meaning of the Constitution changes, and he sometimes seems to suggest that
this happens, at least with respect to the meaning of the constructed
Constitution.68 I prefer to draw the lines somewhat differently; I believe it is
sensible to say that meaning remains fixed, while both applications of
forward-looking provisions and implementing doctrine may change. But
whether you consider Balkin’s theory exactly as presented in the book, or
with the slight modifications I have suggested here, it is substantially
superior to both classic originalism and classic living constitutionalism. It
offers a vision of constitutional practice that fits with our actual history and
explains why originalists can view departures from original expected
applications, like Brown or Loving, not as errors to be cabined but as correct
as a matter of constitutional law. I think it is correct, and, like Balkin, I
consider myself an originalist.69
IV. Beyond Redemption
So where does this leave us? What happens when everyone accepts
Balkin’s theory of text and principle, as they should? Having discussed the
argument of Living Originalism, I turn now to Constitutional Redemption.
(Balkin suggests the books be read in the opposite order, but I disagree, as I
will explain below.)
It leaves us, Balkin suggests, with an attitude towards the Constitution
that can best be described in terms of faith and redemption.70 The
Constitution is imperfect. Not just because something better could be
imagined; the Constitution is imperfect on its own terms.71 It fails to live up
to its promises. It is fallen.
67. Balkin, supra note 65, at 679.
68. He suggests, for instance, that if we do not agree that Lochner was wrong when decided, we
must explain how the Constitution changed. See id. at 696–98. I disagree; as the text explains, I
think it is easy to see, according to Balkin’s own theory, how outcomes change while the
Constitution does not.
69. But see Tara Smith, Originalism’s Misplaced Fidelity: “Original” Meaning Is Not
Objective, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 1, 5 n.21 (2009) (disagreeing with Balkin’s characterization of me
as an originalist). More precisely, I am an originalist with respect to the meaning of the
Constitution. How a judge should decide a case is a different question.
70. See BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION, supra note 2, at 2, 5 (arguing that “[t]he
legitimacy of our Constitution depends . . . on our faith in the constitutional project” and that we
should embrace a redemptive narrative of our Constitution).
71. See id. at 249 (“The Constitution, and therefore the Constitution-in-practice, always exists
in a fallen condition.”).
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But it may be redeemed. Through the processes of constitutional
change described above, it might better fulfill its promises.72 It will never do
so perfectly—it will always be fallen, always in need of redemption.73 But
we may hope that we will leave it better than we found it. We may—we
must—have faith that our faith is not in vain.
This is a nice vision. It fits in well with the American mythology that
we are a people always striving to realize the promise of America.74 And it
puts the best possible gloss on the fact that people have different views of
that promise. That is why the Constitution is always fallen—there will
always be people who disagree as to how forward-looking provisions should
be applied.75 Balkin’s idea of redemption explains how people can think the
Constitution should mean different things but still all believe in the same
Constitution—it explains how the Constitution can play a centralizing and
legitimating role in American political discourse, why different movements
all make their claims in the terms of the Constitution, and why the
Constitution is not just a monument to past struggles but a battleground for
present ones.76
Yet I think Balkin’s argument is mistaken in some fundamental ways.
This is not the vision of constitutional practice that people are likely to have
or in fact should.
First, what will happen in practice? It seems quite likely that some
originalists will, at least for a while, continue to try to defend the position
that fidelity to the Constitution requires consistency with original expected
applications—that is, they will continue to refuse to acknowledge forwardlooking propositions. It seems likely because the point about the distinction
between meaning and application has been made before, yet classic
originalism persists. In the academic context, the distinction has perhaps
gained currency: Mitch Berman claims that all serious originalists accept it.77
And though that may be an overstatement, even Justice Scalia has
acknowledged the point in his extrajudicial writings.78
When acting as a judge, however, Scalia consistently ignores the
possibility, arguing to the contrary that a practice accepted at the time a
72. See id. at 27 (arguing that his account of the Constitution is the “story about the eventual
fulfillment of promises made long ago”).
73. See id. at 249 (“[The Constitution] is an unfinished building, and perpetually in need of
repair and renovation.”).
74. See Daniel Bell, “American Exceptionalism” Revisited: The Role of Civil Society, PUB.
INT., Spring 1989, at 38, 46 (describing the conviction that America was to be dedicated to the
liberty and dignity of the individual in realizing a better world and characterizing the American
Revolution as having left the people in control of their social order).
75. See BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION, supra note 2, at 10 (“People disagree with
each other about the best way to go forward, and the best way to redeem the Constitution.”).
76. See id. (describing the ways that Americans disagree over the proper interpretation of the
Constitution and noting that “[w]e do not know whose version of the Constitution will prevail”).
77. Berman, supra note 24, at 28.
78. Scalia, supra note 41, at 144–45.
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particular constitutional provision was ratified cannot subsequently become
unconstitutional by reason of changed societal attitudes.79 Why his practice
is inconsistent with his more academic writings is not clear, but it is hard to
avoid suspecting that he clings to original expected applications because
classic originalism was developed and marketed precisely in order to
promote those applications and delegitimize the contrary Warren Court
decisions.80 Originalism cannot assimilate Balkin’s insights and still do the
political work its early proponents hoped for.
So political factors may prevent people from accepting the distinction
between meaning and application that Balkin proposes. There may be
psychological factors at work as well. Classic originalism, at least as
practiced by Scalia, allows its wielder to avoid responsibility for hard
decisions (all the value choices were made by the ratifiers) and to accuse
anyone who disagrees of willful infidelity to the Constitution.81 That is an
easier worldview to have than one in which judges are required to pay
attention to the current sociopolitical climate and try to implement fixed
principles in changing circumstances.
But even if people were to accept the distinction, as I do, I do not think
that the attitude of faith in redemption that Balkin describes is the proper
consequence. One problem is that the idea of redemption makes sense
primarily with respect to the application of forward-looking provisions. If I
think the Constitution is defective because of its structural provisions—
giving equal Senate representation to California and Wyoming, for instance,
or the operation of the electoral college—redemption through construction
will not do much for me. Ditto if I think that the structure, while perhaps
adequate as conceived, fails when political parties enter the picture.82
Even with respect to the forward-looking provisions, though, I am
disinclined to accept the image of a fallen Constitution in need of
redemption. Something is fallen because it has fallen, and it must have fallen
from somewhere. Balkin’s account seems to require a prelapsarian moment,
a constitutional Eden. But that never existed. Nor is it entirely sensible to
regard the Constitution as fallen just because the Court’s interpretation of a

79. Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 95 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
80. See Greene, supra note 14, at 679–82 (discussing the early promotion of originalism and its
goal of popularizing judicial restraint as a way of undermining the criminal procedure, First
Amendment, and substantive due process decisions of the Warren Court).
81. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 567 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(accusing “this most illiberal Court” of “writ[ing] into the Constitution” the “smug assurances of
[the] age”).
82. For instance, political parties play havoc with the Framers’ notion of separation of powers.
The Framers envisioned government officials feeling institutional loyalty to their offices, so that
each branch would naturally act to protect its power and restrain the others. But party loyalty
clearly trumps institutional loyalty, so that a Congress controlled by the President’s party may not
check him much, and one controlled by the opposition party may try to make him fail rather than
cooperate in governance. Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not
Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2312, 2312–16 (2006).

2012]

Reconstruction and Resistance

135

forward-looking provision does not embody my views. If I lose out in this
argument—perhaps I believe that the Equal Protection Clause guarantees
same-sex marriage, but the Court disagrees—the Constitution has not failed
to live up to its promise. According to the account of constitutional change
developed above, the Constitution surely could have accommodated my
vision. (It contains multitudes.) The failure lies with the Court and the
American people; they are the ones who have not accepted it. And perhaps
that should not be counted a failure. In constitutional politics, like ordinary
politics, there are winners and losers, by design. If I believe that the point of
the Equal Protection Clause is to enforce the will of a national majority,83 I
can hardly complain just because the majority does not share my views.
Just as failure to prevail with respect to the application of a forwardlooking provision does not mean the Constitution is fallen, success does not
mean it is redeemed. To say that a particular decision (take Loving as an
example) redeems the promise of the Equal Protection Clause suggests that
Loving was somehow present in the drafting or ratifying.84 But it seems very
unlikely that many of the drafters or ratifiers believed that the Clause would
require states to permit interracial marriages.85 Those who did were outliers
and extremists. To suggest that their views are and were the true meaning of
the Clause makes it into a Trojan Horse, whose real contents were hidden
from the ratifiers until judges, like Sinon, released them on an unsuspecting
nation.86 This is one view of constitutional change—it seems to be Ronald
Dworkin’s, for instance87—but it does not sound to me like legitimate
change.
Nor is it actually consistent with the theory behind forward-looking
provisions. The point of a delegation, as I have described it, is not that the
drafters and ratifiers had secret hopes about the true meaning of the
principles they enacted that might someday be realized, nor that they enacted
a principle about whose content they were ignorant, awaiting explanation
from philosopher–judges. It is that they actually wanted the future to decide.
The ratifiers agreed that equality was important, and they deserve credit for
that.88 But Loving is the work of the Warren Court and the political and

83. Roosevelt, supra note 46, at 102–04.
84. I have some difficulty making out Balkin’s view on this point. He persistently denies that
redemption means “the unfolding of preordained events, or returning to a determinate path already
marked out.” BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 1, at 76. But if not, why call it redemption
rather than simply delegation?
85. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 1, at 183.
86. VIRGIL, THE AENEID 30–31 (Ernest Rhys ed., E. Fairfax Taylor trans., E.P. Dutton & Co.
1907).
87. DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW, supra note 17, at 7–12.
88. See generally Steven G. Calabresi & Julia T. Rickert, Originalism and Sex Discrimination,
90 TEXAS L. REV. 1 (2011) (arguing in favor of an anticaste original public meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
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social movements that made that decision possible.89 It is not the work of the
Reconstruction Congress or the ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment.90
Classic originalists, I have said, seem to want to attribute all constitutional
outcomes to the ratifiers, while living constitutionalists want to give
responsibility to the present. Redemption seems to transcend this dichotomy
as well, imagining an intemporal partnership, but it gives too much credit to
the past and too little to the present.
If the idea of redemption has as many problems as I suggest, why does
Balkin introduce it? I suspect it is for the reason that social movements, as
Balkin notes, frequently cast their arguments as redemptive: enlisting the
authority of the Framers gives greater normative purchase.
Normative purchase is something that Living Originalism struggles
with.91 The book does two very different things. It describes how
constitutional law is practiced, and it argues for particular understandings of
provisions such as the Commerce Clause92 and Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment.93 The arguments are not presented just as models of
constitutional construction; they are meant to persuade. But since Balkin
simultaneously tells us that many different constructions are possible,94 it

89. See Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA.
L. REV. 1, 7–18 (1996) (discussing the political history underlying Warren Court jurisprudence).
90. Perhaps especially not the ratifiers, given the coercion involved in obtaining ratification. As
Michael W. McConnell has explained:
The state ratification debates did not dwell on the details of the proposed Amendment,
and—an important point—the margin of victory for the Amendment was attained by
coercion of the Southern states rather than by winning the support of the electorate in
three-fourths of the States. When an Amendment obtains its supermajority through
congressional exercise of its power to condition readmission of states to the Union, it is
a fiction to treat the opinions of the people of the various states as controlling; it is
Congress that effectively exercised the amendatory power.
Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947, 1109
(1995).
The fact that the Reconstruction Amendments were forced on an unwilling South explains why
they have had such an unusual career, with an early eclipse as Reconstruction was abandoned and
then a return in what has been called the Second Reconstruction. For the forced nature of the
Reconstruction Amendments, see id. For a discussion of the demise of the era of Reconstruction
with the rise of white supremacy, see ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED
REVOLUTION 1863–1877, at 585–87 (1988). For the Second Reconstruction, see C. VANN
WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 6–10, 122–47 (3d rev. ed. 2002). The Civil
War and its aftermath make the American constitutional experience quite unusual, which is one
reason it might not hold many lessons for other countries. Our federalist structure is another. Given
that the Supreme Court’s great successes came in imposing the national will on outlier states, it may
not be reasonable to expect other countries’ high courts to achieve similar successes if they do not
have a similar federal structure with regional variance.
91. Indeed, at the end of Constitutional Redemption Balkin tells us that he became an originalist
because he wanted greater normativity. See BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION, supra note 2,
at 247–50.
92. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
93. Id. amend. XIV, § 5.
94. See, e.g., BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION, supra note 2, at 39 (“[R]easonable
people disagree, and often quite strongly, about the best interpretation of the Constitution, how to
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becomes harder to be forceful about the correctness of these ones. (It is, as I
said, like a magician who explains the trick and then performs it, and it is
perhaps in order to place the performance before the explanation that Balkin
suggests that Constitutional Redemption be considered a prequel to Living
Originalism.95)
To put the point generally, Balkin’s historicism saps normativity. He is
not a relativist—he rejects explicitly the idea that every dominant opinion is
correct relative to its time—but he does not have much in the way of a
transtemporal criterion of correctness. His theory of constitutional change,
partisan entrenchment, is almost entirely nonnormative: win elections, put in
your judges, and the Constitution will reflect your views.96 He argues that
his constructions are superior according to the traditional modalities of
constitutional argument—text, structure, history, prudence, and so on—but
this is not a particularly inspiring set of criteria.
It is not as inspiring, certainly, as the idea of keeping faith with the
Founders and redeeming the fallen Constitution. None of Balkin’s doctrinal
arguments packs the emotional punch of his story about how all of American
constitutional history is the struggle to fulfill the promise of the Declaration
of Independence.97 The idea of redemption allows Balkin to give his
arguments a moral dimension, to sound more like someone struggling over
constitutional meaning at the ground level than an observer hovering above
the fray.98

apply it to new situations going forward, and whether to rethink old constructions in light of
changed circumstances.”).
95. Id. at 289.
96. Id. at 201; Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Processes of Constitutional Change:
From Partisan Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 490
(2006); Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA.
L. REV. 1045, 1066–83 (2001) [hereinafter Balkin & Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional
Revolution]. As I tell my students, in the long run, we get the Constitution we deserve.
97. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION, supra note 2, at ch. 2.
98. Balkin is certainly not above the fray. He has his own views, which he argues for in Living
Originalism. He participated in the litigation over the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(ACA), filing a brief arguing that the act could be supported as an exercise of the taxing power.
Brief of Constitutional Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners (Minimum
Coverage Provision), Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, No. 11-393 (Jan. 13, 2012), 2012 WL
135050. But even in these contexts, his historicism gives him a different perspective. The Supreme
Court’s acceptance of the arguments against the ACA as Commerce Clause legislation, in Balkin’s
view, is a success for constitutional entrepreneurs such as Randy Barnett. It is an example of how
political movements and political parties can change the terms of constitutional debate, and though
it happened surprisingly quickly, it is not different in kind from the way in which arguments in
favor of constitutional protection for same-sex marriage gained acceptance. Jack M. Balkin, From
Off the Wall to On the Wall: How the Mandate Challenge Went Mainstream, ATLANTIC (June 4,
2012, 2:55 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/06/from-off-the-wall-to-on-thewall-how-the-mandate-challenge-went-mainstream/258040/. Other constitutional law professors,
by contrast, view the Court’s acceptance as an abandonment of legal principle. See, e.g., Ezra
Klein, Of Course the Supreme Court Is Political, EZRA KLEIN’S WONKBLOG, WASH. POST
(June 21, 2012, 12:42 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/wp/2012/06/21/ofcourse-the-supreme-court-is-political/ (quoting Yale Law Professor Akhil Amar, “If they decide this
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But there are two problems with this move. First, it is unnecessary.
Constitutional arguments with respect to the application of forward-looking
provisions can have moral weight quite apart from the idea of redemption.
Here are some constitutional arguments whose success or failure has
determined the outcome of constitutional cases. Women are not too timid
and delicate to practice law.99 Interracial marriage is not against God’s
plan.100 Same-sex relationships are not deviant expressions of mental
illness.101 These are not part of the traditional modalities of arguing about
meaning—they are not in Philip Bobbitt’s taxonomy.102 But they are
constitutional arguments, and they are also the sort of claims that people are
inspired to rally around or rally against. The magic of the Constitution is that
through delegations, through the possibility of constitutional politics, it can
achieve its own transubstantiation. It can make our moral discourse—it can
make our everyday lives—into matters of constitutional significance. (The
last thing I tell my students is that the Constitution is their responsibility.)
There is no need to add that pursuing such causes will redeem the promises
of the Declaration.
And will it? The second problem with the idea of redemption is that it
is not entirely persuasive. The story Balkin tells in Constitutional
Redemption describes the Declaration as fundamentally concerned with
equality and American constitutional history as an attempt to fulfill that
promise. But this is not so clear. Equality is the first great principle
mentioned in the Declaration, of course, but to say that all men are created
equal is to describe their starting point, the consequence of divine action. As
far as the responsibilities of human government go, the Declaration does not
proclaim equality to be an inalienable right, and it does not state that
government has any obligation to protect or promote it.
Even if the Declaration were centrally concerned with equality, it is
hard to make a case that this principle made it into the Founders’
Constitution.103 The Founders’ Constitution does not explicitly require the
by 5-4, then yes, it’s disheartening to me, because my life was a fraud. Here I was, in my silly little
office, thinking law mattered, and it really didn’t. What mattered was politics, money, party, and
party loyalty.”).
99. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 131 (1872).
100. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 3–12 (1967).
101. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635–36
(1996).
102. PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 3–8 (1982).
103. Pauline Maier and David Armitage have suggested that there is little evidence the
Declaration had influence on the drafting of the Constitution. PAULINE MAIER, AMERICAN
SCRIPTURE: MAKING THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 165–67 (1997); DAVID ARMITAGE,
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: A GLOBAL HISTORY 92 (2007). Given this lack of
connection, the idea of redeeming the Declaration via the Constitution is a little odd. The
Declaration was never ratified by the American people, and using the Constitution to realize its
values is only marginally more sensible than using the Constitution to redeem the French
Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen or the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of
Human Rights.
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government to treat people equally, and even if we suppose that the Due
Process Clause contained some equality principle,104 that clause bound the
federal government and not the states. The issue of states discriminating
among their own citizens was not one to which the Founders’ Constitution
gave much thought. Consistent with the revolutionary paradigm, it saw the
distant general government as the threat and the states as the natural
protectors of liberty.105
Balkin’s story about the role of the Declaration in American life relies
on one main authority: Abraham Lincoln.106 Lincoln is a hugely important
figure in American constitutional history, and his embrace of the Declaration
matters. In describing America as a nation “dedicated to the proposition that
all men are created equal,”107 Lincoln sought to change our self-conception,
to elevate equality above liberty as the fundamental American value. He
sought to locate this value in the past for the same reason that Balkin and
other constitutional entrepreneurs do today: arguments are always more
powerful when they call on us to redeem our commitments, to keep faith
with the revered figures of our history. And he chose the Declaration rather
than the Constitution because the Founders’ Constitution is plainly more
concerned with liberty. The Declaration was all he had.
The Gettysburg Address is a beautiful piece of rhetoric, and it is justly
considered one of America’s constitutive documents. All the same, I do not
find Lincoln’s claim entirely persuasive on its own terms. As far as the
Declaration goes, the Southern secessionists had the more obvious claim to
stand in the shoes of the signers. They were the ones asserting the right to
alter or amend a form of government they feared had become destructive of
their rights.108 They were concerned in very large part about the right to own
slaves, of course,109 but that simply reinforces the parallel. The secession of
104. It does now, of course. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (noting that
serious “discrimination[s] may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process”). And there is a
plausible argument that the drafters and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment understood “due
process” to have a substantive egalitarian component. The case is weaker for the Fifth Amendment,
however. Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 YALE L.J.
408, 454 (2010) (concluding that, based on a variety of historical evidence, the ratifiers of the Fifth
Amendment had, at most, a limited conception of substantive due process).
105. Kermit Roosevelt III, What if Slaughter-House Had Been Decided Differently, 45 IND. L.
REV. 61, 65–66 (2011).
106. Lincoln is not alone, of course. For discussions of the Declaration’s role in American
political and constitutional history, see generally SCOTT DOUGLAS GERBER, TO SECURE THESE
RIGHTS: THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1995)
and ALEXANDER TSESIS, FOR LIBERTY AND EQUALITY: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF THE
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (2012).
107. Abraham Lincoln, Address Delivered at the Dedication of the Cemetery at Gettysburg, in 7
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 22–23 (Roy P. Bassler ed., 1953), available at
http://quod.lib.umich.edu/l/lincoln/.
108. JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA 56–57 (1988).
109. The Mississippi Secession Declaration, for instance, opens by stating: “Our position is
thoroughly identified with the institution of slavery—the greatest material interest of the world.” A
DECLARATION OF THE IMMEDIATE CAUSES WHICH INDUCE AND JUSTIFY THE SECESSION OF THE
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slaveholding states from a nation that had banned the practice is a description
that fits the American Revolution as well as, if not better than, the Civil
War.110 Indeed, the first American slaves who fled their masters to join an
army that promised them freedom were not southern slaves heading North in
the Civil War; they were colonial slaves joining the British.111 The
Confederates certainly saw themselves as the true heirs of the signers. The
South Carolina Secession letter, for instance, repeatedly echoes the
Declaration and places it above the Constitution, not because it champions
equality but because it affirms the right of the people to alter or amend their
form of government.112
So I do not think that Lincoln was correct in identifying equality as the
core American value in 1863. But Lincoln was a constitutional entrepreneur,
and much of the point of such claims is that they become correct if people
accept them. Lincoln’s claim did prevail. Equality has taken its place in the
pantheon of American values. Is Balkin then right to invoke the Declaration,
as Lincoln did?
I don’t think so. Lincoln’s claim remains unpersuasive with respect to
the Declaration, the Founders’ Constitution, and pre-Civil War America.
When his vision prevailed, it was through the force of Union steel and the
strong-arm tactics of the Reconstruction Congress. America, though not
Lincoln himself, saw the new birth of freedom that he prophesied; we had
Reconstruction and the Reconstruction Amendments. That is where equality
entered our higher law, and that is when.
Of course, it was a promise initially unfulfilled. Here Balkin’s account
of redemption actually makes much more sense. Why, one might ask, would
a constitutional provision ever fail to achieve its full purpose? The
supermajority that enacts it surely has power to enforce its desires. (This is
why talk of aspirational provisions so often makes them into Trojan Horses:
the “aspirations” tend to belong to a small subgroup.) But not with the
Reconstruction Amendments. Those Amendments were forced on the
defeated South by a Congress that knew it would soon be reseating Members
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI FROM THE FEDERAL UNION para. 2 (1860), available at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th century/csa_missec.asp.
110. British courts consistently held that no master–slave relationship could exist in England;
any slave who set foot in England became free. E.g., Somerset v. Stewart, [1772] 98 Eng. Rep. 499
(K.B.) 499–501. The British banned the African slave trade in 1807 and emancipated existing
slaves in 1833. U. O. Umozurike, The African Slave Trade and the Attitudes of International Law
Toward It, 16 HOW. L.J. 334, 339 (1971). By contrast, among the Union states at the time of the
Civil War, Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, and the newly created West Virginia all
recognized slavery. Mark A. Lause, Border States, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL
WAR: A POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND MILITARY HISTORY 252, 252–54 (David S. Heidler & Jeanne T.
Heidler eds., 2000).
111. Henry J. Richardson III, The Black International Tradition and African American Business
in Africa, 34 N.C. CENT. L. REV. 170, 175 (2012).
112. DECLARATION OF IMMEDIATE CAUSES WHICH INDUCE AND JUSTIFY THE SECESSION OF
SOUTH CAROLINA FROM THE FEDERAL UNION (1860), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th
century/csa_scarsec.asp.
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deeply opposed to Reconstruction. Indeed, the Reconstruction Congress
faced fierce opposition from the President and the Supreme Court, and the
venture was largely abandoned with the Compromise of 1877. With the
Reconstruction Amendments, we do indeed have a situation where the
framers of the amendments could not achieve their goals. Redemption
occurred through later constitutional construction, driven and assisted by
social movements, in what C. Vann Woodward called the Second
Reconstruction of the Warren Court.113
So there is something doubly odd about Balkin’s appeal to the
Declaration. Not only does he choose a less than fully convincing object of
devotion, but he ignores one that more obviously fits his purposes, a situation
where the value he champions—equality—did enter our Constitution, only to
be rebuffed. Lincoln had no choice, no text other than the Declaration, but
Balkin does. The Constitution has changed since the Founders’ days, not
through construction but through amendment. There are words about
equality; there was a war about it, and we won.
Or did we? There’s the rub. Who won the Civil War? Ask an
American who won the Revolution, or World War II, and the answer is clear:
we did, we the Americans, we the United States. But ask about the Civil
War, and the answer will usually be “the North,” with a “we” only if the
respondent hails from above the Mason–Dixon line. The Civil War remains
intensely divisive, as does Reconstruction. The project of keeping faith with
the Founders appeals to everyone; keeping faith with the Reconstruction
Congress does not. That is why our civic religion of the Constitution is so
Founding centered, and that is why Balkin looks back to the Declaration: to
find consensus.
Consensus is nice, of course, and if we believe that the value of equality
can be found there, it may be possible, to some extent, to use the Declaration
as a placeholder or euphemism for Reconstruction. But there are also real
costs to trying to maintain continuity with the Founding.114 For while Balkin
engages in his heroic reconceptualization of the Declaration (it reminds me
of Michael McConnell’s struggle to make the classic originalist case for
Brown115), other people appeal to the Founding for other purposes.
One way to understand American constitutional history is as a constant
struggle between the values of the Founding and the values of
Reconstruction. The Founding, put broadly, stands for individual liberty, for

113. For the first use of the term “Second Reconstruction,” see C. Vann Woodward, The
Political Legacy of Reconstruction, 26 J. NEGRO EDUC. 231, 240 (1957). For further explication of
the concept of the Second Reconstruction, see RICHARD M. VALELLY, THE TWO
RECONSTRUCTIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR BLACK ENFRANCHISEMENT 149–98 (2004) and
WOODWARD, supra note 90, at 6–10, 122–47.
114. See Aziz Rana, Freedom Struggles and the Limits of Constitutional Continuity, 71 MD. L.
REV. 1015, 1019 (2012) (arguing that “the American failure to similarly embrace rupture and to
break from constitutional faith played a critical role in sustaining practices of subordination”).
115. McConnell, supra note 90, at 953.
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limited federal power, for the ability of states to run their internal affairs as
they see fit.116 Reconstruction stands for equality, for broader federal
authority, for federal rights and federal laws protecting individuals from their
own states. The contest between the nation and the states erupts with the
Civil War, and the Reconstruction vision enters our Constitution afterwards.
But it is quite quickly pushed back by the Redeemers and the Klan.117 The
Second Reconstruction of the Warren Court restores the values of
Reconstruction, but it too meets opposition. In part, this opposition focuses
on specific doctrines: affirmative action, school desegregation, voting
rights.118 But in part it takes the form of a more comprehensive theoretical
attempt to delegitimize the decisions of the Second Reconstruction. It takes
the form of classic originalism, which seeks to elevate the Founding above
Reconstruction. Classic originalism is the legal theory of the Second
Redemption.119
Balkin takes this theory on, and I think he demonstrates quite plainly
that it is mistaken: some constitutional provisions may be designed to have
applications that change over time. But there is another problem with the
attempt to decide cases based on Founding-era values, to which he gives less
attention. We like to think that our constitutional history is a success story,
that the wisdom of our Founders has served us well for over two hundred
years. But the truth is that the Founders’ Constitution was a failure. It lasted
seventy years and then came apart in what we must hope is the costliest war
America will ever suffer. If the Constitution had any goal, it was to avert
that war, to prevent the mass slaughter of Americans by Americans. (Threequarters of a million dead120—how’s that for “domestic Tranquility” and the
“blessings of Liberty”?) To talk about the success of our Constitution
without considering the Civil War brings to mind the old joke: apart from
that, Mrs. Lincoln, how did you like the play?
Balkin tends to glide over the discontinuity. His attempt to avoid this
unpleasantness is laudable in some ways. But by looking back to the
116. At least, this is the Founding as compared to Reconstruction. Compared to the Articles of
Confederation, the Founding Constitution stands for strong national power. The tension between
the nation and the states goes back to the very beginning; it is there in the Declaration itself, in the
question whether the Declaration produced fully independent states or whether it called into being a
single American nation, as Lincoln argued. (The Gettysburg Address dates the founding of the
nation to 1776, not 1789.) I think it is telling that the Declaration’s final paragraph talks of “united
States” rather than the “United States” of the Constitution.
117. For background information on The Redeemers, see C. VANN WOODWARD, ORIGINS OF
THE NEW SOUTH 1877–1913, at 1–22 (1951).
118. For a discussion of the Second Redemption, see, for example, Jamie B. Raskin,
Affirmative Action and Racial Reaction, 38 HOW. L.J. 521 (1995).
119. Except, ironically, in the area of affirmative action, where the conservative Justices seem
entirely indifferent to both history and text, consistently reading the Equal Protection Clause as if it
said “No state shall engage in racial classification.”
120. See J. David Hacker, Recounting the Dead, OPINIONATOR, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2011,
9:38 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/09/20/recounting-the-dead/#more-105317
(discussing new estimates that Civil War deaths numbered approximately 750,000).
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Declaration, he accepts the legitimacy of Founding-centered
constitutionalism, which has significant costs. It suggests that the Founding
provides the appropriate lens through which to view issues of federal–state
relations, which is simply not the case. When we talk about the federal–state
balance, we should be thinking not about Philadelphia but Gettysburg, not
about the Federalist Papers but the Reconstruction Amendments. Yet the
Supreme Court persistently appeals to the Founding in its attempts to draw
federal–state boundaries, most recently in the Patient Protection Affordable
Care Act decision, where Chief Justice Roberts wrote movingly about the
nation our Framers dreamed of.121 Balkin rejects classic originalism, but by
looking back to the Declaration he accedes to the decisive move in the
conjuring trick of the Second Redemption: the suggestion that we still live
under the Founders’ Constitution.
Conclusion
Balkin’s theoretical analysis is spot on and devastating to classic
originalism. It may finally drive a stake through the heart of that doctrine.
Or it may not. But if it does, is the next step to redeem the Declaration? I
am not so sure. Balkin’s story about the Declaration is beautiful and
inspiring, and if we all wanted to take the same principles from the Founding
era, it might give us a way to go forward together. But not everyone wants
what he wants, and I can tell a different story about America. Here it is:
America was born in sin, conceived from a deal with the Devil.
Maintaining slavery was the price of independence and of union, for neither
could have been achieved without the support of the slaveholding states.
Though many Founders opposed slavery personally, they accepted it. They
elided it in the Declaration; they protected it in the Constitution. And they
brought forth a new nation.
But the Devil will have his due. America paid; she paid with her
children. For her posterity, the Founders’ Constitution brought not the
blessings of liberty, but the curse of war.
Lincoln knew this. He elevated the Declaration because he knew that
the Founders’ Constitution was a “covenant with death” and “an agreement
with Hell.”122 He knew that the Civil War was a judgment upon us, that
“every drop of blood drawn with the lash, shall be paid by another drawn

121. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, No. 11-393, slip op. at 3–4 (June 28, 2012). Justice
White once provided a rare reminder that this is the wrong history. New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144, 207 n.3 (1992) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (pointing out that
Founding-era historical analysis is inappropriate since “the nature of federal-state relations changed
fundamentally after the Civil War”).
122. These words belong not to Lincoln but to his abolitionist contemporary William Lloyd
Garrison. PAUL FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS: RACE AND LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF
JEFFERSON 3 (2d ed. 2001).
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with the sword.”123 America paid the heaviest price she has ever suffered.
And then she rebuilt herself. From the ruin of the first sin, she was born
again. The Reconstruction Amendments turned the Founders’ Constitution
inside out and upside down. The federal government interposed itself
between the states and their citizens; the nation committed to protecting her
people. Reconstruction redeemed America and gave us a Constitution
worthy of our faith.
But then we struck another bargain. The Compromise of 1877, the end
of Reconstruction, the redemption of the South: we purchased national
reconciliation at the cost of racial justice. We healed the wounds of the Civil
War on the backs of the freedmen.
Almost a hundred years later, a Second Reconstruction came to restore
the promise of the first. And as night follows day, there came a Second
Redemption as well, a new generation to raise the old banner. The party of
Lincoln adopted the Southern Strategy. Ronald Reagan launched his 1980
campaign by praising states’ rights before a crowd in Philadelphia,
Mississippi, where civil rights workers were murdered sixteen years
before.124 When he won, his Justice Department adopted a strategy of
constitutional interpretation designed to undermine the decisions of the
Second Reconstruction.
Time and again we have done this. American history repeats the
bargain over and over, diminuendo; the first fall echoes down the years,
growing fainter but never entirely still. The struggle continues, and each
generation must decide anew which version of America will prevail: the
Founding or Reconstruction, liberty or equality, the nation or the states.
Like Balkin’s, this is just a story. Like Balkin’s, it leaves some things
out and emphasizes others. But I think it has some truth too. The difference
is that it is less conciliatory. Balkin tries to avoid the tension between
Reconstruction and the Founding by locating the values of Reconstruction in
the Declaration, which allows him to say that America has always struggled
to realize the value of equality. My story is less about the struggle of
America, in which all can participate, and more about the struggle for
America, in which we must choose sides. It identifies villains, which
Balkin’s generally does not.
Maybe Balkin’s story is more effective; maybe it is all our fallen time
can accept.125 But we should remember that in the past we purchased

123. Abraham Lincoln, Second Inaugural Address, in ABRAHAM LINCOLN, SPEECHES AND
WRITINGS 1859–1865, at 687 (1989).
124. Girardeau A. Spann, The Conscience of a Court, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 431, 458–62
(2009).
125. People can repent, however. In 2005, Ken Mehlman, the head of the Republican National
Committee, told the NAACP that the Southern Strategy was wrong. Rudolph Alexander, Jr.,
Differential Laws for African Americans: Inequality from the Past Continues to the Present, 25
T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 27, 46 (2008) (“Chairman Mehlman acknowledged and admitted that the
Republican Party was wrong in playing the race card . . . .”).
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reconciliation at the price of justice. We should remember that Chief Justice
Warren wrote an opinion in Brown that was “above all, non-accusatory,”126
and that is why, half a century later, a different Chief Justice could claim that
Brown prohibited state attempts to avoid de facto segregation, that it
identified simple racial integration as a forbidden state purpose.127 The ghost
will not rest, the past will not be past, until we can call it by its proper name.
Until we can all say that we won the Civil War. We the People of the United
States.

126. RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V.
AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 699 (rev. ed. 2004).
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127. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 726 (2007)
(describing “racial balance” as “an objective this Court has repeatedly condemned as illegitimate”);
id. at 746–47 (describing the school district’s use of racial classifications to eliminate de facto
segregation as “once again” telling schoolchildren “where they could and could not go to school
based on the color of their skin” as in Brown).

